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Abstract
We propose a modified version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz’s (1984) eﬃciency wage
model by introducing temporary contracts in the standard setup. New theoretical
insights emerge on the incentive problem faced by workers and firms. We argue
that the existence of temporary contracts broaden the incentive menu available to
employers and that the optimal incentive structure can be sustained as an equi-
librium outcome only if permanent contracts do not disappear. We also provide
an alternative explanation of the wage penalty suﬀered by temporary workers
even if standard models of eﬃciency wages would predict higher compensations
for workers facing a higher job loss risk.
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1 Introduction
The idea that firms need to elicit eﬀort from workers dates back to Adam Smith since
he observed that “the wages of labor are the encouragement of labor which like every
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other human quality improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives: Where
wages are high accordingly we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent and
expeditious than when they are low” (Smith 1937, p. 81). In this paper, we argue
that the existence of temporary contracts broaden the incentive menu available to
employers and that the optimal incentive structure can be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome only if permanent contracts do not disappear. We also provide an alternative
explanation of the wage penalty suﬀered by temporary workers even if standard models
of eﬃciency wages would predict higher compensations for workers facing a higher job
loss risk.
Besides the influential contribution on the alternative explanations of involuntary
unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), eﬃciency wage theories have been proved
to be suﬃciently flexible to explain several aspects of the labour market. For instance,
Bulow and Summers (1986) and Albrecht and Vroman (1992)rationalize the persistence
of “good jobs” - oﬀered in the primary sector - and “bad jobs” - oﬀered in the secondary
sector - in an equilibrium where equally skilled workers are paid diﬀerent wages on
diﬀerent jobs. Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003) show that in the presence of a double
moral hazard problem arising when firing costs must be paid for unfair dismissals,
higher severance payments reduces employment. The original model has also been used
to provide empirical evidence of the positive relationship between wage premiums and
productivity (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991) and between employment protection and
worker eﬀort (Ichino and Riphahn 2005). In our case, the eﬃciency wage approach is a
good candidate to explore the incentive mechanism through which fixed-term contracts
aﬀect the working of the labour market in terms of wage diﬀerentials and the share of
flexible contracts in the economy.
The only attempt to introduce fixed-term workers in the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz
setup is due to Güell and Mora (2010). The authors show that temporary contracts
may actually increase unemployment. This result, though, heavily depends upon the
minimum wage to be high enough. As temporary contracts amplify the flow into the
labour market, a higher minimum wage raises the value of being unemployed. The
only way firms react is to provide greater incentives to avoid shirking, and the level
of employment falls. Our analysis diﬀers from this work in several aspects. First,
we allow temporary contracts to be either renewed or converted into permanent con-
tracts. Allowing for renewal rates is a non-trivial complication of the model, because
workers know that before running into an open-ended job oﬀer they can experience
multiple spells of temporary positions. In this way, the incentive problem faced by
firms changes dramatically, and so does the equilibrium wages and the unemployment.
Second, we endogenously determine optimal conversion and renewal rates without re-
lying on exogenous labour market institutional features. Third, our main interest is
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not to compare the equilibrium unemployment arising in the one- and two-tier labour
market, but rather to describe some stylized facts presented in the next section. In
particular, the model formalizes the use of temporary contracts in an eﬃciency wage
framework in which profit maximizer firms optimally set the share of temporary to
permanent workers to satisfy participation and incentive compatible constraints as well
as cost minimization. As pointed out by Dolado et al. (2002), several factors may ex-
plain the equilibrium ratio of temporary to permanent employees1. We argue that this
ratio is also linked to the incentive structure arising in a dual labour market. When
firms increase their temporary workforce, the ratio of TCs over PCs cannot exceed a
given threshold because it would be impossible to provide suﬃcient incentives to avoid
shirking behavior. It follows that, when fixed-term positions can be renewed, converted
into permanent positions or ended at will by the employers (while permanent positions
last until an exogenous job break-up), the coexistence of both contracts is necessary to
have a steady state mass of non-shirking workers who are paid accordingly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some stylized
facts of dual labour markets. Section 3 describes the model, while section 4 presents
the results. We discuss the economic implications in section 4. Section 5 concludes and
sheds light on future research.
2 Stylized Facts (in progress)
This section presents some stylized facts of European Labor Markets which are
rationalized by the model.
• Existence of a considerable upward mobility from temporary positions to perma-
nent employment.
According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2002), between one-third and two-thirds
of temporary workers move into a permanent job within a two-year time interval. A
natural consequence is that even if in the short run we can observe positive renewal
rates, in the long run they must converge to zero.
• Wages for temporary positions tend to be lower than wages for permanent posi-
tions, even after controlling for workers and job characteristics.
1In particular, the authors identify the followings: (i) the elasticity of substitution between tem-
porary and permanent workers; (ii) the relative wage of workers; (iii) the gap in firing costs between
contracts; (iv) the diﬀerence in hiring costs; (v) the volatility of labour demand along the business
cycle; (vi) the average growth rate.
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The existence of a wage diﬀerential between temporary and permanent workers has
been reported for many European Countries. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) find a 9-11%
wage gap for the Spanish experience. Blanchard and Landier (2002) conclude that the
wage gap has risen from 12% in 1983 to 22.5% in 2000. Hagen (2002) comes to similar
conclusions for Germany, even if diﬀerent methodologies lead to large diﬀerences in the
magnitude of the wage penalty suﬀered by temporary workers.
• The share of temporary contracts over permanent contracts tends to be stable over
time.
Another important finding in the literature of temporary contracts is that there is a
substantial stability of the share of temporary workers over permanent workers. Table
1 shows the share of temporary workers over permanent workers for the period 2000-
06. Hence a theoretical long run equilibrium must comply with a fixed proportion of
temporary workers in the economy.
Table 1: Share of Temporary workers over Permanent workers
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 0.082 0.075 0.079 0.081 0.102 0.103 0.100
Belgium 0.071 0.067 0.061 0.066 0.068 0.073 0.075
Czech Republic 0.101 0.099 0.092 0.102 0.092 0.082 0.082
Denmark 0.096 0.083 0.086 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.086
Finland 0.150 0.149 0.144 0.146 0.147 0.149 0.146
France 0.171 0.158 0.142 0.137 0.140 0.153 0.154
Germany 0.143 0.139 0.134 0.138 0.145 0.169 0.173
Greece 0.129 0.126 0.117 0.108 0.117 0.112 0.100
Hungary 0.083 0.089 0.086 0.091 0.081 0.082 0.080
Ireland 0.038 0.047 0.046 0.038 0.032 0.030
Italy 0.096 0.089 0.092 0.090 0.110 0.117 0.126
Luxembourg 0.027 0.038 0.042 0.025 0.042 0.052 0.060
Netherlands 0.131 0.133 0.138 0.148 0.154 0.167 0.183
Norway 0.079 0.076 0.084 0.084 0.090 0.081 0.084
Portugal 0.228 0.232 0.248 0.235 0.230 0.230 0.243
Spain 0.440 0.428 0.426 0.427 0.440 0.463 0.471
Sweden 0.150 0.141 0.140 0.141 0.151 0.161 0.174
Switzerland 0.118 0.121 0.134 0.133 0.134 0.144 0.151
United Kingdom 0.063 0.063 0.060 0.057 0.058 0.056 0.055
Source: elaboration from OECD data.
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• The majority of newly hired workers enter the labour market through fixed-term
positions.
As pointed out by Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), the majority of new hires is on
temporary jobs.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
The economy is populated byH infinitely-lived risk neutral workers identical in their
abilities and preferences, and by N profit-maximizer firms sharing the same technology
described by the production function f(eL), where L is the labour force at the firm level
and e is the eﬀort exerted on the job. Thus, labour is the only input for production.
An employer-employee relationship can be regulated either by a fixed-term contract (t)
or a permanent one (p). The former lasts for one period and, at the expiration, it can
be converted into a permanent contract with probability cp, renewed as a temporary
position with probability ct or neither of them with probability 1− cp − ct. Thus, this
structure is able to replicate a work life cycle in which workers may reach a stable job
after a succession of short-term jobs and unemployment spells.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed. While unemployed workers look for
employment opportunities, employed workers produce and do not search on the job. We
assume that labour supply is inelastic therefore, since a job opportunity provides almost
the utility of an unemployment position, workers will accept opportunity that arises.
Utility is linear and is described by the instantaneous utility function U (wi, e) = wi−e,
where wi is the wage received while holding the i− th contract, i = {p, t}. In line with
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the levels of eﬀort can take only two values, positive and
fixed (no-shirking) or null (shirking). In the latter case there is no production. Since
all workers are identical, they respond to incentives in the same way and whether or
not they shirk depends on the incentives they face. We also assume that workers are
equally skilled and aim at maximizing the expected present value of their lifetime utility
discounted at the inter-temporal rate δ. Time is continuous2. If workers decide to shirk,
the eﬀort is null and they gain higher levels of utility while facing a probability b of
being caught shirking and then being fired3. It follows that, on average, shirkers tend
2Allowing for discrete time does not change our results.
3Since 1973, the evidence that a large fraction of the U.S. labor force is involved in supervision
rather than the direct production of goods and services shows the importance of the monitoring
activity. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Work in America. Task Force Report.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃce, 1973.)
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to spend more time as unemployed. In addition, while permanent jobs disappear at
the exogenous rate q, temporary workers become unemployed following the endogenous
choice of firms to neither renew the fixed-term contract or convert it into a permanent
position4. Obviously, both permanent and temporary non-shirking workers enjoy a
lower utility with respect to shirkers because of the cost associated to the eﬀort, but
have better expectations on their job stability. Moreover, temporary workers also take
into account the opportunity of contract renewals and conversions, the probability of
which are common knowledge.
Finally, unemployed workers can enter the labour market by receiving either a per-
manent job oﬀer with probability ap or a temporary job oﬀer with probability at5. These
probabilities will turn out to be endogenous as they both depend on the steady-state
equilibrium condition and firms’ optimal behavior6.
3.2 Asset Values and No-Shirking Conditions
We first characterize the decision problem faced by permanent workers. As in
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), imperfect monitoring implies diﬀerent flow values accord-
ing to the option of being, respectively, a non-shirker or a shirker. Let V np and V sp 7
be, respectively, the present discounted value of lifetime utility for a non-shirker and
a shirker worker holding a permanent contract. Regular dynamic optimization asserts
that treating expected utility as the asset value corresponding to a given state implies
that the asset value of both kind of workers equals dividends plus expected capital gains
(or losses). Thus:
δV np = (wp − e)− q(V np − Vu) (1)
and
δV sp = wp − (q + b)(V sp − Vu). (2)
To interpret the above equations, note that the shirker receives (current period)
utility of wp. If she does not experience an exogenous separation and she is not caught
shirking (an event which will occur with probability (1 − q − b), then she will has the
4Notice that the positive eﬀort requirement is exogenous (e), as are the Poisson parameters b and
q.
5We assume that the event of receiving both types of oﬀers has a negligible probability.
6It is important to note that the Poisson parameters ap and at are determined in a stationary
equilibrium but are exogenous from the individual’s point of view.
7Since we assume that all firms are the same, the value of utility both for non-shirker and shirker
workers does not depend on what employer oﬀer a contract because they set the same wage.
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same value in the next period. Also notice that the value of shirking is the same in every
period because if it is optimal for the worker to shirk, it continues to be optimal, thus we
do not allow for the possibility of worker to change his optimal strategy. On the other
hand, if a shirker does experience an exogenous separation or if she is caught shirking
(an event which will occur with probability (q + b), then she will suﬀer a lost given by
the diﬀerence between the value of being employed and the value of being unemployed.
The interpretation of the asset of a non-shirking worker is similar: current period utility
is lower (because of the higher eﬀort) as well as the probability of becoming unemployed
is lower.
Obviously, workers will choose not to shirk only if the expected lifetime utility of
being a non-shirker is no smaller than that of being a shirker. That is, a condition
referred to as the no-shirking condition (NSC). Therefore, the problem faced by a firm
is to set the wage suﬃciently high to deter its workers from shirking. At the same time,
there is no need to pay a wage bill above the minimum needed to induce eﬀort. Thus,
the firm chooses wp so that V p just equal Vs, and the minimum rent that workers are
willing to accept must satisfy the following no-shirking condition (NSCp):
Vp − Vu = e
b
. (3)
Equation 3 has two important interpretations. On the one hand, it implies that
firms set wages high enough so that workers strictly prefer employment to unemploy-
ment. Moreover, the size of the rent is increasing in the level of eﬀort and decreasing in
the rate at which shirkers are detected and fired. On the other hand, since workers are
homogeneous and the value to being unemployed is the same for all workers, there is a
unique (lowest) wage satisfying the no-shirking condition. Thus, for a permanent con-
tract firms will pay a wage which is the lowest wage at which the no-shirking condition is
satisfied: wp = e+δVp+q(Vp−Vu) = e+δVu+δ(Vp−Vu)+q(Vp−Vu) = e+δVu+ eb(δ+q).
The critical wage is increasing in the level of eﬀort, the value to being unemployed,
the probability of an exogenous separation and the discount rate, while is decreasing
in the detection probability. The economics behind this result is that the penalty upon
shirking, i.e. the asset loss, should be strong enough so as to deter opportunistic be-
havior. Thus, according to the principal-agent paradigm, firms use monetary incentives
scheme in order to avoid opportunistic behaviors.
Moreover, as it will become clear in what follows, since in a one-tier labour market
monetary incentives are the solely instruments, in the two-tier system firms use both
monetary and non-monetary incentives. Temporary workers could be also encouraged
by non-monetary incentives such as the opportunity of a promotion in a permanent
position or/and the possibility of a renewal. Therefore, the asset values of tempo-
rary positions reflect the instability related to the contract. Indeed, at the contract
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expiration, workers can be either laid oﬀ or retained by the firm under both type of
contracts.
Diﬀerently from permanent workers, temporary jobs do not disappear at an ex-
ogenous rate8 thus, temporary workers suﬀer the lost of the temporary-to-unemployed
transition (Vt − Vu) exclusively for firms’ inactive behavior. However, they can alter-
natively enjoy a conversion into a permanent position or a renewal into a temporary
contract. In particular, while in case of a conversion workers enjoy the asset diﬀer-
ence between a permanent and a temporary positions, when the contract is renewed,
even if the asset does not change, workers suﬀer the lost of opportunity of becoming a
permanent worker by receiving direct oﬀers for permanent position9. Thus, we quan-
tify the magnitude of this loss with the value of becoming unemployed and enjoy the
unemployed-to-permanent job transition (Vp − Vu) conditional on the probability ap10.
As for permanent workers, temporary workers choose whether or not to shirk. Shirk-
ing generates a higher instantaneous utility than non-shirking. On the other hand, the
expectation of being employed is shorter for a shirker than for a non-shirker. Specif-
ically, temporary employment gives an instantaneous utility of wt for a shirker versus
(wt − e) for a non-shirker. Non-shirkers separate from their job only in case of firms’
inactive behavior, while shirkers become unemployed either because firms detect them
or, if they are not being caught shirking, because of firms’ inactive behavior. Note that
in case of shirking detection a shirker suﬀer the lost of the opportunity of a promotion
in a permanent position.
8While this assumption make our results comparable with respect to the traditional model of
eﬃciency wages, allowing for the same or diﬀerent break-up rates does not alter our qualitative results.
9Economists have recently estimated the utility cost of precarious forms of work by examining
the diﬀerence in the stated job satisfaction of individuals who are employed in temporary jobs with
those who occupy permanent positions. Even thought their study did find evidence that fixed-term
contracts are stepping-stones towards permanent jobs (especially for women), Booth et al. (2002)
have shown that temporary jobs in the UK are not desirable because they are associated with lower
levels of job satisfaction and poorer work-related training. The strong dissatisfaction of temporary
workers is also highlighted by Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005[a]) in the case of Greece. Moreover,
Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005[b]) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van-Praag (2006) have embarked on
cross-country comparisons to show that the ultimate eﬀect of the type of contract on job satisfaction
seems to depend on institutional features of the countries under investigation, which determine the
extent to which individuals who work on temporary contracts do so by choice rather than compulsion.
In accordance with the practice of a number of psychological experiments (Gilbert, 2006), many papers
attempt to obtain a monetary estimate of the extent of the utility loss associated with a move to non-
permanent employment, by comparing the premiums of permanent position with those of temporary
ones.
10Notice that here we do not explicitly formalize the choice of accepting/rejecting an oﬀer, instead
it will be taken into account through the fact that only unemployed workers are/can looking for a job.
Therefore, since a worker is employed, she or he can not receive new job oﬀers.
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Hence, while the term ap(V np − Vu) represents the value of the opportunity that
both type of temporary workers lose when holding a renewed fixed-term contract, the
term cp(V sp − V st ) represents the value of the opportunity that shirkers lose when they
are caught and fired. The former captures the idea of the impact of job instability on
individuals’ well-being and quality of life compared to those in permanent contracts,
while the latter captures the idea that being caught shirking leads to a diﬀerent asset
loss for temporary workers compared to permanent workers.
The asset values for non-shirker and shirker workers holding a temporary contract
read, respectively, as follows:
δV nt = (wt − e) +
− {(1− ct − cp) (V nt − Vu)￿ ￿￿ ￿
firm￿s inactive behavior
(4)
− ct[(V nt − V nt )−ap(V np − Vu)￿ ￿￿ ￿
loss
]
￿ ￿￿ ￿
renewal
−cp
￿
V np − V nt
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
conversion
}
and
δV st = wt − b[(V st − Vu) + cp(V sp − V st )]− q(V st − Vu) +
− (1− b− q) {(1− ct − cp) (V st − Vu) + (5)
− ct[(V st − V st )− ap(V sp − Vu)]− cp
￿
V sp − V st
￿}.
The fixed-term worker chooses to exert eﬀort if the value of not shirking is at least
as large as the value of shirking on that job, and the minimum incentive that temporary
workers accept can be found by equating the previous two equations. It can be written
as:
(Vt − Vu)ct − ap(Vp − Vu)ct + [(Vp − Vu) + (Vp − Vt)]cp = eb (6)
The last equation is the no-shirking condition for temporary workers (NSCt). It
states that firms can provide both monetary and non-monetary incentives in order to
avoid shirking.
Since agents exhibit a forward looking behavior, they are interested in future wages,
but they also know that wages are conditional upon the probability of being a temporary
or permanent worker in the next period. Thus, today’s wage earners may accept a lower
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payment as temporary workers as long as there is a higher probability of becoming a
permanent worker. In more detail, the way firms can provide incentives to workers -
the LHS of eq. 7 - can be decomposed in three terms. The first two addends tells us
that, for a given conversion rate, increasing the renewal rate has two opposite eﬀects.
From one side, a greater ct aﬀects positively the incentive profile because wages for
fixed-term positions are weighted more when utility is discounted at its present value.
In other words, the more it is likely to be a temporary worker in the next period, the
more workers will be interested in higher wages for temporary positions. On the other
side, as long as Vp is greater than Vt, a higher ct increases the value of the outside option
of entering the labour market as permanent workers from the pool of the unemployed.
Intuitively, if workers know that when they accept a temporary contract they will
encounter multiple spells of fixed-term positions because of a higher renewal rate, they
are giving up the possibility of earning higher wages if they were permanent workers.
Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger the higher is the wage diﬀerential between permanent
and temporary jobs (Vp − Vt). To summarize, the conversion rate acts as an imperfect
substitute of wages paid to fixed-term workers. The last term says that firms can
encourage workers to put eﬀort by promising them (through cp) a wage as permanent
workers, and this incentive is more eﬀective the greater is the wage diﬀerential between
permanent and temporary workers.
Summing up, the lowest incentive compatible wage for temporary workers is: wt =
e + δVt − (1 − cp)(Vp − Vt) = e + δVu + δ(Vt − Vu) − (1 − cp)(Vp − Vt) = wp − ebq −
δ(Vp − Vt)− (1− cp)(Vp − Vt). In particular, by comparing the wage of permanent and
temporary workers, we observe that the latter reflects both the absence of an exogenous
separation rate (q) and the diﬀerence between the value of a permanent position with
respect to the temporary one by keeping into account two scaling factors, the odds of
not obtaining a conversion (1− cp) and the intertemporal discount rate (δ). The next
two equations give us the diﬀerence between the value of permanent and temporary
contracts and the diﬀerence between the latter and the value of being unemployed:
(Vp − Vt) = e
b
(1− cp − ct + ctap)
(cp − ct) (7)
and
(Vt − Vu) = e
b
(2cp − ctap − 1)
(cp − ct) . (8)
Workers who accept temporary or permanent jobs enjoy the asset change because
they move away from the unemployed stock. In what follows, we assume that un-
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employed workers enter the labour market either through temporary or permanent
contracts. Thus, the value of being unemployed reads as follows:
δVu = ap (Vp − Vu) + at[(Vt − Vu) + (Vp − Vt)cp], (9)
where at and ap are the (endogenous) arrival rates, respectively, of temporary and
permanent jobs. Workers who accept a job put value to the asset change they experi-
ence. In particular, those who accept a temporary contract also put value both to the
opportunity of becoming a permanent worker with probability cp and to the event of
contract renewal with probability ct11.
3.3 Wages, Participation Constraints and Optimal Renewal and
Conversion Rates
We now derive the incentive compatible wage structure arising in the two-tier system
when firms optimally set renewal and conversion rates. First, notice that the condi-
tion under which permanent workers decide not to shirk (NSCp) coincides with the
their participation constraint. Thus, they strictly prefer employment to unemployment
obtaining a rent which firms can not modify because the size of this rent depends ex-
ogenously both on the level of the eﬀort and the detection technology, i.e.: given a
strictly positive rent, workers are always willing to accept a permanent contract.
Diﬀerently by looking at equation 8, we notice that the rent can be driven to zero
when firms set the optimal values of the conversion and renewal rate. In the two-tier
system, firms can deter shirking of temporary workers even by paying to them a null
premium (corresponding to the reservation utility of being unemployed) but allowing
for the opportunity of a promotion in a permanent position and/or the possibility of a
renewal. This means that:
e (2cp − 1− ctap)
b (cp − ct) = 0. (10)
The space of all the possible solution candidates is characterized by the following
conditions: ￿
cp =
1
2 +
1
2ctap
0 < ct + cp ≤ 1
. (11)
Figure 1 plots a graphical representation of the problem.
11Notice that the value of a renewal is related to a null asset change.
11
Figure 1: Minimum incentive space
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Given ap, the set of combinations of ct and cp for which Vt − Vu = 0 is one of the
lines in the “E” area. The “A” and “B” areas identify all combinations of ct and cp for
which, respectively, cp < ct and cp > ct. In both areas, firms deter shirking by paying
a premium over the reservation utility (Vt− Vu > 0). Diﬀerently, the levels of ct and cp
in the “C” area are the combinations for which workers strictly prefer unemployment
to temporary positions (Vt − Vu < 0)12.
For a given renewal rate ct in the “E” area, the optimal conversion rate is increasing
in the arrival rate of permanent positions. A higher ap increases the asset loss of
becoming a permanent worker when unemployed and it must be compensated with a
higher expectation for temporary workers to be converted into permanent ones, thus cp
must be higher. In other words, the employer rewards the lower utility with a higher
opportunity of a promotion in a permanent position. Also, a higher ap means that even
if a temporary worker is caught shirking and is fired, she faces a higher opportunity to
find a permanent job from the unemployment stock. Obviously, the reduction on the
risk of unemployment should be oﬀset with the promise of a higher cp.
Notice that for a given ap, the optimal conversion rate is increasing in the level of
the renewal rate. The interpretation is straightforward. In a two-tier labour market, a
higher ct means more stability for workers holding a temporary contract. This reduces
the fraction of temporary workers who are laid oﬀ by the firm (1 − cp − ct) and the
number of unemployed is lower. Since it is easier for unemployed workers to find either
permanent or temporary jobs, firms prevent shirking by oﬀering a higher cp. Also notice
that when firms never oﬀer permanent contracts to the unemployed (ap = 0), at least
one-half of temporary contracts must be converted into permanent positions in order to
elicit workers’ eﬀort independently from the renewal rate. To sum up, in the “E” area
the eﬃciency wages are: ￿
wp = e+ δVu +
e
b(q + δ)
wt = e+ δVu +
e
b(1− cp)
. (12)
Using Eq. 12 and 9, we can write an explicit solution for the wage incentive struc-
ture. In particular, the eﬃciency wage for permanent workers reads as follows:
wp = e+
e
b
(ap + δ + q) +
e
b
at(
1
2
+
1
2
apct). (13)
It is easy to notice that when at = 0, the eﬃciency wage is the same as in Shapiro-
Stiglitz, because the market collapses to the one tier system and no temporary positions
12This area includes the cases for which the renewal and conversion rates are the same (ct = cp)
where no finite wages exist to simultaneously deter shirking and satisfy the participation constraint.
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are available.
The eﬃciency wage for temporary workers is:
wt = e+
e
b(ap(1 +
1
2ct)− 12) + ebat(12 + 12apct). (14)
In Shapiro-Stiglitz the only alternative to employment is unemployment, diﬀerently,
in our model the penalty for being caught and fired can be interpreted instead as the
utility loss associated with not having a permanent position. Since an unemployed
worker is indiﬀerent between holding a temporary job and remaining unemployed, the
introduction of fixed-term contract has no eﬀect on the no-shirking condition for perma-
nent workers (3), which is always equal to e/b. Nevertheless, the level of their eﬃciency
wage is higher because they can also find a job as temporary workers. On the other
hand, the eﬃciency wage for temporary workers reflect two penalties. The first is that
of becoming unemployed because of the firm’s inactive behavior. The second is due to
the fact that it is not possible to get a permanent job through ap in case of contract
renewal.
Even in the presence of equally productive workers, the existence of dual labor
markets implies that firms find optimal to pay a wage diﬀerential in favor of permanent
workers. As long as wp > wt, firms can use the conversion rate as an optimal policy to
avoid shirking of workers and, simultaneously, firms can use the renewal rate in order
to minimize wages both for permanent and temporary workers. Once the no-shirking
conditions are satisfied, an extra-dollar paid to workers would not produce any benefit
to the firm, but would result in higher costs. It is straightforward to show that both
kinds of eﬃciency wages are increasing in the level of the renewal rate, therefore firms
set the optimal level of ct in order to minimize production costs. It turns out that firms
set ct = 0 while the optimal level of the conversion rate is cp = 12 . Finally, the optimal
eﬃciency wages for permanent and temporary workers are:￿
wp = e+
e
b(ap + δ + q) +
1
2
e
bat
wt = e− 12 eb + 12ap + 12 ebat
. (15)
3.4 Firms’ behavior
Assume that firms are homogeneous and each of the N firms seeks to maximize their
profits. While there are many economic explanations that justify the heterogeneity of
productivity, we prefer to impose that workers are equally productive. In this way, we
are confident that our results do not depend upon any over-imposed economic structure.
We assume a production function f(eL) where each unit of labour produces a constant
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fraction of output (f ￿ = ey) and is paid the incentive compatible wage, wi. The
instantaneous value of profits concerning a position filled either with a temporary or a
permanent worker are, respectively, πt = ey − wt and πp = ey − wp, where the output
price is normalized to one. It follows that each firm, which employs both temporary
and permanent workers, enjoys total profits described by the following formula13:
Π = ltπt + lpπp. (16)
Since the firm’s decision at any date aﬀect profits only at that date, there is no
need to analyze the present value of profits. Moreover, firms optimally choose both the
overall number of workers (L) and the composition of their labour force in terms of
temporary and permanent workers (lt + lp = L).
Since permanent workers must be paid more than temporary ones and workers are
equally productive, firms always prefer to hire the latter than the former. It follows
that the endogenous arrival rate for permanent position is set to zero. Figure 2 plots
isoquants (black lines) and isocosts (red lines). Obviously, the latter have a lower (neg-
ative) slope than the isoquants. Therefore, each level of production could be achieved
at lower costs by hiring exclusively workers under fixed-terms contract14. However as
seen in the previous section, firms must guarantee a positive conversion rate in order to
elicit workers’ eﬀort and to satisfy the participation constraint for temporary workers.
Moreover, in equilibrium expectations should be satisfied and therefore each firm con-
verts a fraction of temporary workers into permanent positions, cp = 12 . Thus, given the
optimal conversion rate (the arrival rate for permanent positions) and by considering
the exogenous separation rate (q) from permanent jobs, in a steady-state equilibrium,
the ratio between the number of permanent and temporary workers employed by a firm
is constant and equals:
lp
lt
= (
1
2
)(
1
q
). (17)
In other words, firms maintain the minimum number of permanent contracts in order
to hire workers under fixed-terms contracts and take advantage of paying them lower
wages. The increasing line in 2 shows this production expansion path. For each level
of output, the combination of permanent and temporary workers that minimize the
production costs is the set of intersection points between the production expansion
path and the isoquants. Note that a higher level of q while does not alter the wage of
13We also assume that the marginal product of labour (ey) exceeds the costs of exerting eﬀort (e)
or, alternatively that y > 1.
14Also notice that the (negative) slope of the isocosts is decreasing in the level of the exogenous
separation rate.
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Figure 2: Cost minimization
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temporary workers, it reduces both the fraction of permanent workers and their wage,
therefore firms produce at lower total costs.
By eq. 17, the number of total workers per firm can be expressed by:
L = lt(1 +
1
2q
). (18)
Therefore, in the steady-state equilibrium, for each temporary worker there must
be 12q permanent workers. Therefore, firm’s profits are:
Π = L
￿
ey − ( 2q
2q + 1
wt +
1
2q + 1
wp)
￿
.
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Firms hire workers up to the point where the marginal product of labour equals
their overall marginal cost. Thus the condition for the marginal product of labour to
equal the wage is:
ey =
2q
2q + 1
wt +
1
2q + 1
wp. (19)
The set of points satisfying 19 is the conventional labour demand curve15.
It is now convenient to express wages in eq.15 in terms of employment per firm,
rather than the rate at which the unemployed workers find a job. Since the economy
is in steady-state, flows into and out the stock of unemployment must balance. In
equilibrium unemployed workers can receive exclusively temporary contracts. Thus, the
flow out of unemployment is given by the arrival rate (at) times the stock of unemployed
workers, H − NL (the diﬀerence between the total labour force and the aggregate
number of employed workers). The flow into unemployment is made up of permanent
workers becoming unemployed at the exogenous separation rate (q) and temporary
workers becoming unemployed because of firm’s inactive behavior at a rate 1− cp − ct.
The equilibrium flow balance is given by:
at(H −NL) = N(lpq + lt(1− ct − cp)). (20)
Using equations 17, 18 and 20, the endogenous arrival rate for temporary workers in
terms of employment per firms is:
at =
2(NLq)
(2q + 1)(H −NL) . (21)
Substituting this into eq. 15, the left hand side of eq. 19 gives us the so called
incentive curve, i.e. the minimum incentive (average) wage that firms must pay to
avoid shirking:
w = e+
e
b
￿
1
2q + 1
￿￿
δ − q + q H
H −NL
￿
(22)
Eq. 22 can be referred as an eﬀort supply function where there is a positive relation-
ship between the critical average wage and the level of employment. In particular, as
the unemployment rate approaches to zero, the critical average wage tends to infinity.
Labour market equilibrium is given by the intersection of the eﬀort supply function
and the labour demand. At this point, workers provide eﬀort and firms obtain the labour
force (NL∗) they want by paying wp(NL∗) to workers under permanent contract and
15In our model, a unit of labour is expressed as a combination of both permanent and temporary
workers, thus the average wage is a linear combination of the two eﬃciency wages.
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wt(NL∗) to workers under fixed-term contract. Diﬀerently, a lowering of wages would
yield shirking. Thus, firms have an optimal strategy given the preferences of workers.
From the workers’ point of view there is involuntary unemployment. While perma-
nent workers strictly prefer working to unemployment, temporary workers, even if they
are indiﬀerent between the unemployment and a fixed-term contract, have the incen-
tive of being converted into a permanent position. Therefore, even if each worker would
work at a lower wage, it would not be a credible commitment. Thus, given the firms’
behavior, the strategy of workers is optimal. Summing up, the equilibrium point where
the labour demand and the eﬀort supply function intersect is a Nash equilibrium.
The analytical solutions of the model are:
NL∗ = H
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ + q (23)
Nl∗t = H
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ + q ∗
2q
2q + 1
(24)
Nl∗p = H
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ + q ∗
1
2q + 1
(25)
U∗ = H
q
(2q + 1)(y − 1)b− δ + q (26)
wp = ey +
e
b
￿
q +
2q
2q + 1
δ
￿
(27)
wt = ey − 1
2
e
b
− 1
2q + 1
δ (28)
4 Conclusions
In this article, we have presented a modified version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz’s (1984)
eﬃciency wage model by introducing temporary contracts in the standard setup. Con-
sistently with some stylized facts of European Labor Markets, our model is able to
describe i) the existence of an upward mobility from temporary positions to permanent
employment; ii) the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts as an equi-
librium outcome; iii) a novel reason of the wage diﬀerential between permanent and
temporary workers.
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